In Defense of the Scholar of the Middle East

Instead of posting an impossibly long diatribe this time, I'd like to let someone else's writing do it for me.

This article comes from, of all places, campus watch, though it is written by an eminent historian Zachary Lockman who has written several fine articles on social history. This particular one outlines the difficulties the discipline of Middle Eastern Studies has gone through in contemporary times.

http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/2120

I highly recommend breezing over it to give you an idea of just how full of politicized bullshit on all ends is the current state of the field. In my view, this is horrifically damaging to scientific research, especially for what I would consider a very young discipline, and as such, with many flaws and omissions yet to be adressed. Yet, these problems cannot be solved adequately while scholars are being polarized along political lines, and both internal and external interests are sabotaging the discipline before it even becomes adequately robust.

My main concern, of course, is the next generation of scholars, of whom I am a part. As a grad student and as someone who knows many other grad students, I can tell you that this is both above our heads and interests yet always a spectre in the back of our minds. It's a hot button issue which we cannot ignore, and which we know could pervert the very reasons we got into the field, which were, by and large, benign and apolitical. We wanted to pursue something which interested us in a scientific, or at least objective, fashion. We did not ask to take sides for anything but logic and the evidence. And yet, if the current climate continues to deteriorate the discipline, even we may find that impossible.

I know this is also a concern for many other scholars and students in the sciences where politics has made an entry. Biology in particular is facing a similar situation with the creationist agenda. The difference is, however, that the biological revolution initated by Darwin and the idea of evolution has since become very robust, and is in many ways a mature (if still incomplete) field of study. Middle Eastern Studies has had a similar revolutionary turn within the last 50 years or so, of whom Edward Said is often seen as the spokeman, but really was initiated earlier with the work of Albert Hourani and his like. Middle Eastern Studies has had to completely re-adjust itself to new theories which dispense with the old (and widely disproven) biases which had accumulated since the beginnings of so-called "Oriental Studies," and right now historians are beginning to ask amazing new ideas which have opened the field to possibilities never dreamed of before, and begun enabling it to ask productive questions which went unasked for centuries. But, all of this is merely in its beginning stages, especially given the fact that funding has only come in impressive amounts since recent circumstances in the region itself drew America into that political arena. Biology, in contrast, is a much elder field. Biology and its foundation in evolution are a staple of every college campus and even most high schools; study of the Middle East is very rare in high school, and on colleges the programs are typically either very small or non-existant. Biologists have collected and analyzed buckets full of evidence which has helped them to modify and strengthen their theories; Middle Eastern scholars are now faced with a daunting mass, several archives big, of untouched historical resources which heretofore have been ignored. And, most importantly, biology and biologists have enough support where they may be able to, with some effort, effectively resist the politicization and downfall of their discipline. Middle East Studies, on the other hand, has not had the time or resources to build itself up enough to guard itself against such attacks.

What I would like to see, personally, is a greater involvement among other scientists and students of the sciences (in all disciplines, physical to social) in the defense of rational inquiry. Middle Eastern Studies is not a willy-nilly art class or humanity; it is, ideally, a sophisticated study of the interrelation of social factors within a significant part of the world, based on evidence and sound reasoning from documented sources. It is not a science like any other, but that does not mean it is therefore not a science. It's major downfall is its youth, and so long as it is free to develop, its potential is astounding. But, if it is stifled before it can mature, then it does a diservice to all seekers of knowledge. The humanities don't want us, the sciences don't like us, and thus far the only attention we've gotten outside the discipline is from ideologues who wish to use us as a political punching bag. If this keeps up, it's not long before we go away for good, or worse, turn into what we were under the Oriental Studies label: nothing more than a justification for political excess under the guise of academic credibility.

So, let this be a call to arms to all those who love knowledge, regardless of the specific narrow field. You do not, of course, have to become a scholar of the Middle East yourselves. Rather, it is enough to have you demand greater intellect from the public discourse, to ignore or better yet criticize the ignorance of politicized pundits who try to discuss the Middle East with no fact or solid reasoning. Stand up against the political brow-beating which has plagued us, and don't accept it. There is a vast ocean of biased misinformation out there, and all it takes to spot it is some rigorous logic and common sense; indeed, no real expertise is needed to do this much. And finally, if you are a professor of the sciences (or the humanities for that matter), talk to Middle Eastern scholars at your schools and let them know that you are behind their academic freedom and will defend them against inflamatory and defamatory comments which will come their way (and both conservative and liberal and even a-political professors of the Middle East will receive such comments, believe me). We all need to break down these artificial barriers between disciplines and recognize that ultimately we're on the same team.

Myths about Islam

Myths about Islam

After seeing the sheer breadth of websites and writings supposedly debunking the myths about Islam, I decided to write my own. As of yet, I have yet to see one even reasonable myth-debunking. They have all been, in my estimation, politically and personally motivated, either for impressing the truth about Islam or defaming it. In my academic circles, I often decry the horrific ignorance of Americans (and Westerners in general) on the subject, but never have I really attempted to set the record straight. This, perhaps, is the real problem: serious academics on the subject are generally loathe to step into the public discourse. We instead shut ourselves off in our obscure journals reading articles from obscure historians and scholars, while the public only receives the arguments and analyses of misinformed shit-heads on popular news programs and the internet. Well, it's time to put my money where my mouth is and do something better.
A couple notes before I begin: I am, of course, biased, because I am on the one hand an atheist who staunchly opposes all religion, but on the other hand I am deeply interested in the subject of Islam and the culture of the middle east. I'm not sure exactly how this is going to affect the outcome of my essay. I'm going to simply try to be as up-front with my opinions as possible, and allow the reader to judged how my biases might be affecting the result. Second, I unfortunately do not have the time to write a seriously cited essay, with direct quotations and everything, nor do I happen to have all of the relevent material in front of me. So, I encourage people to check my facts. To this end, I will try to suggest some readings and sources which would be helpful. Finally, I will select my list of "myths" based on websites I have discovered as well as things I have heard. If the inspiration comes from a particular website, I will link the relevent material.

Contents:
1. Islamic oppression of women
2. Islam inspired a Golden Age of Science
3. Islam is monolithic and unchanging
4. The Muslims took slaves
5. Authority = correct

So here we go:

Myth 1: Islamic oppression of women. "Most of the ill-treatment that women receive in the Muslim world is based on local culture and traditions, without any basis in the faith of Islam. In fact, practices such as forced marriage, spousal abuse, and restricted movement directly contradict Islamic law governing family behavior and personal freedom."

From http://islam.about.com/od/commonmisconceptions/tp/myths.htm

This is not entirely true. On the issue of marriage, the most common law is that the parents have the right to arrange a marriage contract for both girls and boys. Both have the right to refuse the marriage upon reaching a majority age (traditionally this is 7 for boys and 9 for girls, I believe). Of course, silence was taking as consent. This is a HUGE deal. After all, even today not all Muslims are fully aware of all of their legal rights under the Shari'a, especially young ones. While technically it is illegal to fail to inform a child of marriage rights once attaining majority (and there are examples of women successfully anulling unfavorable marriages simply on this technicality), one can imagine that this might slip, especially in the countryside or in more traditional areas. Thus, there are plenty of examples of fathers engaging in illegal activity by forcing their children, particularly girls, of marrying who they say (either with threats, social pressure, or just a lack of information).

On the subject of spousal abuse, it is mostly true to my knowledge, but keep in mind that, as above, it could still occur. Islamic law puts a heavy emphasis on familial privacy, providing much chance for abuse behind closed doors. This is coupled with the fact that Islamic law often requires several witnesses for a crime to be proven. That can be very difficult to accomplish given the privacy of the situation. Further, women in Islamic law are only counted as "half a person" as it pertains to testemony in court. That is, it takes two female witnesses to equal the testamony of one male witness. This can be very difficult for an abused woman, since often (across cultures) people tend to look out for each other's gender. For a woman to get enough witnesses to make a case could be very difficult. And, there is insentive to not bring it to court, as a false accusation can be met with punishment. That is, if the case goes to court and the man is found innocent, the woman can be punished for leveling a false claim.

Edit: I have become aware of a passage in the Quran 4:34 which recommends beating wives as a final resort for continued bad behavior. In this passage, Muslim men are told to first admonish their wives, then refuse to share their beds, and then finally to strike them. However, there are some oddities surrounding this passage, particularly the word used (wadribuhunna واضربوهن). The problem with this word is that the definition is about a page long, and it can mean a variety of things from striking, playing a musical instrument, to travel (I suppose like "hitting the road," and even "to turn away from, leave, forsake, abandon, avoid, or shun," according to Hans Wehr (p. 629). I recall hearing somewhere that some scholars choose the latter translation for this particular passage. Personally, I would not, because that meaning usually requires the preposition idiom " 'an عن" for such an interpretation. In my opinion, the word clearly means "strike them," and Yusuf 'Ali's translation would seem to agree. However, the problem here is exactly what "strike them" means: is it a single blow, or several? Is it to be done with the open hand, a fist, a stick? Is it meant to be a light slap on the face, or a brutal assault which leaves bruises or wounds, or somewhere in between? The real failing is the complete lack of clarity here, and though a kind husband might interpret it in the most benign way (perhaps even nothing more than a light-hearted pat on the rear end), it does seem to have the potential for justifying real abuse. It seems this was a concern for jurists as well. According to Yusuf 'Ali, "Imam Shafi'i considers this [striking the wife] inadvisable, though permissable, and all authorities are unanimous in deprecating any sort of cruelty" (p.190, footnote 547). All of this, taking into account as well that modern Muslim couples tend to love one another, means that spousal abuse is not a common feature of modern Muslim marriage life. However, there is still the possibility for unscrupulous or cruel husbands to justify their abuse.

The restricted movement thing was taboo, but rarely ever enforced. Typically, men and women aren't supposed to associate with each other (non-relatives) in public, and male family members are supposed to escort women. This is mainly a preventative measure to ensure both the morality of the public and the safety of the women. However, as mentioned before, it was rarely ever enforced, and for most of the history of Islam, women were quite active in the marketplace and other public areas. This was typically out of necessity, as in the pre-modern world, most people were desperately poor and had to do whatever they could to scratch out a living. Even in the most strict interpretation, it is not generally accepted to engage in the kind of movement restriction of the Taliban, or their punishments for such acts (death).

In general, Islam considers women spiritually equal to men, but practically inferior. In theory, this inferiority only really takes the form of symbolic oppression, however. Specifically, it entitles women to half shares of inheretence than their male relatives receive, half credibility in a legal setting, and often times more difficult avenues to divorce (a woman cannot get a divorce by saying "I divorce you" three times). However, just as many of these rules could be circumvented for the woman's benefit (and indeed were), they could also be abused by men to turn symbolic oppression into real oppression. In my personal opinion, I think Islamic law tends to allow for the oppression of women not because of any one or two specific rules, but because of the complex nature of the law which allows for so many loopholes. I think these loopholes can be fixed, even without reversing the idea that women are practically inferior to or even simply different from men fundamentally (though that would be the ideal: an unambiguous declaration of equality). However, neither of those things are likely to happen due to Islam's nature as a religion, not simply a body of secular laws. If there is a real problem with Islam the religion, this is it.

As a general background, I highly recommend Leila Ahmad's book, "Women and Gender in Islam." She is a fantastic scholar with some brilliant ideas, and she has no qualms about taking jabs at Islam itself when the evidence suggests it. Or, John Esposito wrote a very good general book called "Women in Muslim Family Law," which is somewhat less brilliant and less controversial, but is an easy read with solid information. I would also recommend highly the various works of Beth Baron and Lisa Pollard, both of whom I consider the pre-eminent scholars in the history of women in the Middle East.

For more directed studies, see:

Agmon, Iris. Family and Court: Legal Culture and Modernity in Late Ottoman Palestine.
Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2006.

Meriwether, Margaret L. Family and Society: The Kin Who Count in Ottoman Aleppo, 1770-1840. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999.
Tucker, Judith E. In the House of the Law: Gender and Islamic Law in Ottoman Syria and Palestine. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.
Note that there are MANY great books on women, gender, and Islam, and these are only a few out of the sources I've collected. Don't be afraid to do your own research or mine the bibliographies of these sources if you are really interested. If not, Leila Ahmad's book should suffice.

Myth 2: Islam inspired a Golden Age of science.

I've already commented extensively on the Golden Age, so I won't belabor the point too much. However, I had to address this particular website's explanation:

http://www.thereligionofpeace.com/Pages/Myths-of-Islam.htm#science

Now, it is true that there are Muslims who claim that the Golden Age was directly inspired by Islam. This is, of course, ludicrous, and does not even make rational sense. Typically, this very idea of a Golden Age, let alone one inspired by Islam, is touted by reformers of both a religious and secular variety in the Muslim world who wish to enact some sort of political agenda. Of course, Muslims do not have a monopoly on idealizing history or making upon arrogant and incorrect explanations for it (In America, our favorite political stick from history is the the Revolution and the Founding Fathers). None of it comprises even a passable historical explanation.

However, the debunking of this website is what I really wish condemn. It is, without much exception, a flagrantly idiotic and falsified account of history without any supporting fact either in the article itself or in any legitimate scholarly work I've studied, primary or secondary. Allow me to demolish each point:

1). This is not entirely objectionable. Indeed, most of the translators were Christians (some Jews too, I think), especially Nestorian Christians. However, this was because they had the early expertise, often being fluent in Greek, Syriac, and Arabic, a very helpful combination. However, this quote is beyond stupid: "One large reason for this, however, was that access by Christians to this part of their world [Europe] was cut off by Muslim slave ships and coastal raids that dominated the Mediterranean during this period." This is balls-out false. First, these Christians had no ties with Europe. It was not "their world;" their homes in the Middle East were their world. That's how they knew Arabic so well (duh). Furthermore, the Christendom of Europe would not even accept them; since most of them were Nestorians, they did not believe in the Trinity, which didn't sit well with either the Catholic or Greek Orthodox church. And, of course, the Jews of the Middle East would not have been particularly love-lorn for Europe either: remember that the Jews generally consider the Levant the Holy Land, while Europe was the "diaspora," i.e. a place of exile. You do the math. Second, the slave trade was only one part of the general commercial activity in the Mediterranean at the time. And, it was certainly not an exclusively Muslim enterprise: Christian Europeans, especially the Italians, were widely engaged in the slave trade for hundreds of years, even so far as to selling slaves to the Muslim East. And finally, even if there were a giant wall in place of the entire Mediterrenean sea, how in the hell does that prevent people in the East from going to Europe? It was actually easier to cross the Bosphorous at Constantinople or the Straits of Gibraltar in al-Andalus (Spain/Morrocco) than to undertake a highly risky sea voyage given medival technology. This person's explanation is just fucking stupid, straight up nuts, and one only needs some common sense to spot it. With no knowledge of the facts, this person's statement can be adduced as rediculously irrational. Yet, I felt it pertinent to comment, since I've even heard smart people make similar kinds of arguments, and often times with the subject of Islam, glaringly obvious fallacies tend to get credence for some reason.

The fact of the matter is that many of the translators were Christians who had called the East home for generations, were on great terms with their Muslim neighbors, and said Muslims often paid the translators extremely well for their services (kind of makes sense of the sheer volume of translated texts which came out of the period). In some way, it is valid to claim that Islam had a role in this: at the time, it was much more accepting of this particular Christian sect than either Catholic Europe or the Orthodox Byzantine Empire. But, in my mind a facilitator is not the same as an inspirer. That is, the real credit for the translation movement goes to the people involved, both the Muslims and the Christians (and Jews) who put their differences aside for the sake of their own love of knowledge.

2). "Many of the scientific advances credited to Islam were actually “borrowed” from other cultures conquered by the Muslims." This doesn't even make logical sense. How does one borrow something one created? Either they came up with it or they didn't. This can only be a linguistic trick to try to discredit ALL real discoveries Muslims made. The writer continues by arguing that the Muslims did not invent the concept of zero. No shit. I've never heard anyone claim otherwise that it came from an earlier Indian tradition, and it's widely cited as such by the very texts written by Medieval Muslim mathemeticians.

And then we have this masterpiece of laughable ignorance and bold-faced (literally) lying: " In fact, conquered populations contributed greatly to the history of “Muslim science” until gradually being decimated by conversion to Islam (under the pressures of dhimmitude). The Muslim concentration within a population is directly proportional to the decline of scientific achievement. [note: author's boldface type] It is no accident that the Muslim world has had little to show for itself in the last 600 years or so, since running out of new civilizations to cannibalize."
This is just fucking stupid. Of course "conquered" populations contributed to the movement, but don't extend this period of "conquering." After all, the Islamic conquests took place in a few short decades, whereas the Golden Age stretched for hundreds of years. Ask a 12th century inhabitant of Damascus if he felt like he was "conquered." At best, this particular statement is completely irrelevent to anything. At worst, it's an attempt to dissasociate the idea of Muslim and Islam from the people who contributed to knowledge at the time. This is because the author's premise is obliterated by the fact that Muslim scholars participated too, and in the majority no less. Now, being decimated by conversion to Islam is just idiotic, especially citing this bullshit about dhimmitude. First, it is true that Muslim leaders placed an extra tax on non-Muslims, or "dhimmis," in accordance with the rules of the Qur'an. This is because the Qur'an requires Muslims to protect non-Muslims, but also that only Muslims can serve in the army in non-Muslim nations, so to do their part, non-Muslims had to pay a special tax (this is the justification I recall reading in the Qur'an, unfortunately I can't remember the verses). It was on the one hand a symbolic gesture of showing they would not use the Muslim's good will to cause trouble, and on the other a financial exchange. But, on the whole, the people who participated in the translation movement and the production of original texts were sponsored by elites and payed well enough that the dhimmi tax would not have been particularly burdensome. In fact, many of the early Christian translators had plenty of money left over to finance public building projects and other acts of civic charity, and this remained true for dhimmis throughout the history of the Middle East (I seem to recall reading about one particular Christian business man in Ottoman Palestine who actually funded the building of a Muslim Mosque). Even poor Christians and Jews would often have their head tax paid for them by more wealthy members of the community. In short, this particular tax was practically a non-issue (taxes in general, on the other hand, always were a burden for the lower classes across sectarian lines).
Now, the bolded sentence. This is a flat out lie. There is no other explanation. It's a lie. First of all, how does one quantify "scientific acheivement?" Second, where are the figures? Where are the sources? Never have a seen a single scholarly essay or book make a claim event remotely like this. It is a lie, a flat out lie. To make such a monumental claim without any evidence is completely rediculous.
And, I'll leave the last sentence to you, dear reader. Hopefully you've read my previous work on the Golden Age, so you know that the idea of a 600 year stagnation is completely bogus. The whole point of this article seems to be to denigrate Islam under the veneer of factualism. It is certainly not apologism to say the author is a liar, it's just the way it is. It's complete trash both factually and logically. One need not even know a thing about Islam to spot the egregious fallacies of the author. It's pathetic. But, I hope by demonstrating it's ignorance I can give some impetus to the reader to be more aware of logical fallacies which, for some reason, seem to slip by even the honest, intelligent reader on the topic of Islam.
3). "Even the great Muslim scientists and icons were often considered heretics in their time, sometimes for good reason." This is an unfair generalization. Not all Muslims scientists were accused of heresy, and those who were were not accused of heresy by all Muslims. Typically, the heresy accusation is only flung at rivals. For instance, al-Razi, who certainly was controversial, was typically only considered a heretic by his intellectual opponents who took issue with many of his scholarly views. Keep in mind that a scholar's source of income was a wealthy patron, and thus scholars had to compete furiously with one another in order to get grants. Sometimes this would get very heated: for instance, there is the tale of the great grammarian and poet al-Mutanabbi who once showed up a fellow grammarian in a point of language, and was subsequently beaten severely by the offended gentleman. Throwing out the accusation of heresy was just a part of this. Hence, why even a controversial figure like al-Razi still commanded a lot of respect in his own lifetime from the general public (and from patrons). Perhaps the best analogy of how the term heretic was used at the time is the way in which the word racist (or maybe socialist, for you Democrats) is thrown about today in order to slander political opponents.
4). "even the contributions that are attributed to Islam (often inaccurately) are not terribly dramatic. There is the invention of certain words, such as alchemy and elixir, but not much else that survives in modern technology that is of any practical significance." This is massively false. Muslim science contributed much more than just words. These words would have had no significance were it not for the fact that the ideas they describe having some sort of real value. While it is true that a lot of the ideas proposed during this period are no longer of use, this doesn't make them any less significant. It'd be like saying British law was insignificant to America because we have our own Constitution now. It's ludicrous. Or, it would be like claiming the astrolabe was insignificant because we have GPS now. Furthermore, some processes and ideas, in their bare-bones, still basically exist today: the method of distilation and extraction; the invention of alkalais; many astrological observations; and even the modern fields of sociology and economics we owe to Muslim thinkers. These are just a few examples. The quoted statement above is simply nonsensical and false to the extreme.
But it gets worse: "Neither is there any reason to believe that such discoveries would not have easily been made by the West following the cultural awakening triggered by the Reformation." This is the classic "put a hundred monkeys in front of a hundred typwriters and eventually they will produce Shakespear" argument. It's illogical, ahistorical bullshit. This is the very last cry of someone who is so desparate to prove Islam is anti-science, but cannot come to grips with the widely-acknowledged fact of the influence of Muslim scientists and philosophers on the West, and therefore must stoop to this childish reasoning. It can just as easily be turned around and said, "There is no reason to believe that Muslims would not have invented modern biology had Darwin not proposed evolution first." There is no reason because their is no evidence, because it DIDN'T HAPPEN. One cannot simply make up an alternative, fictional history in order to disprove the real history. And that's not even mentioning he fucked up his European history by crediting the Reformation with Europe's scientific awakening (typically, the Renaissance and the Enlightenment are the usual culprits, or at least the industrial revolution and the birth of the modern era about 200 years ago).
And lastly, the author brings up the complete non-sequeter of coffee, which has nothing to do with the intellectual acheivements of anyone (unless you think caffeine might have kept them up all night thinking), finally ending on a statement claiming that Muslims today only use modern advancements for terrorism: "Today’s Islamic innovators are primarily known for turning Western technology, such as cell phones and airplanes, into instruments of mass murder." This would be news to the hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of Muslim (culturally or religiously) doctors, scientists, engineers, authors, poets, historians, social scientists, and so forth using these "Western" ideas to better their world and ours by enriching us with both culture and new advances in technology and technique. If the author were right, there would be no Albert Hourani or Edward Said, both of whom revolutionized the history of the Middle East with their wonderful (or in the case of Said, wonderfully controversial) ideas and scholarship. We wouldn't have the mathematical theories of Lutfi Zadeh, the economic work of Mahbub al-Huq, or even the brilliant writing of such figures as Nagib Mahfuz. Muslims (and Arabs) have contributed monumentally to the cultures of the world, including our own American culture, and their creative innovations have enhanced more lives than can be counted. To characterize all modern Muslims as terrorists is flat out imbicilic, and if I may dare, possibly even racist (gulp) on the part of the author.
The real truth of the matter is that there have been many Muslim scientists and scholars, both past and present, who have contributed significantly to the world's body of knowledge. This probably wasn't due to Islam, though at certain times Islam may have played a circumstantial factor. Rather, it was because these people were just brilliant, and we owe them a debt of gratitude for their inspiration and their acheivements. Defaming them by either denegrating their acheivements or pinning them on faith is simply childish and despicable.

Myth 3: Islam is monolithic and unchanging.
We'll end with this myth before the essay gets overly long (too late), but it encompasses a host of assumptions that seem to go into just about every conversation I hear about Islam among non-experts (and even some Muslims). Hopefully, this section will help you, the reader, identify specious claims as they happen, even without knowing the details, as there is a fundamentally logical flaw behind them all.
Let us begin with the most common problem of treating Islam as monolithic or unchanging: catagorical statements. It's very common to hear critics and apologists alike throwing around catagorical statements about Islam such as "Islam is a religion of peace" or "Islam is a religion of war." It's neither. People are warlike, people are peaceful, and they can find whatever justification they want for their actions in Islam, or pretty much any ideology for that matter. The fact is, different people have different interpretations of their religion across both space and time. Truly, it is very interesting to study the history of religion, Islam included, precisely because of how much the concept itself changes over time. Islamic law especially is fascinating due to the arguments and judgments presented, which can vary drastically from one another, even though the jurists are basically working from the same sources. There is a wealth of juridical literature on the subject, as well as numerous tafsirs, or explanations of the Qur'an, that differ from individual jurist to individual jurist. In fact, I recently discovered it is not even entirely correct to say catagorically that Islam is against usury, as I just read a fatwa from Rashid Rida (early 20th Syrian century jurist) condoning it! Of course, I've also read a fatwa from some of his contemporaries in India claiming that in it against Islamic law to use industrial paints that contain trace amounts of alcohol in them, and Rida responded by resoundingly denouncing their ruling. The possibilities for interpretation and argumentation in Islamic law are so vast, and that's even just using the Hadith and the Qur'an, let alone past juridical reasoning (of which four major schools of thought are based in Sunni Islam). This means that the conception of law, and of Islam, has massive room to change, and like all ideas, it does so quite often. Making catagorical claims is simply ludicrous. If one wants to make a claim that Islam says this or that, it's fine to do so with some proper citation of Qur'anic passages and/or Hadith, complete with convincing explanation (i.e. not taking a quote out of context and resolving it with potentially contradictory quotes, with which religious texts are replete). But catagorical statements given without question or argument are purely idiotic, and worse, illogical. Islam is no different from anything else in this regard. Yet, it bears mentioning because of how people seem to overlook basic common sense when it comes to discussing Islam.
Finally, it should go without saying that there is a wide gulf between theory and practice. That is, reading the Qur'an will not give you a one-to-one correspondence or explanation to the thoughts and actions of Muslims. This is true for any religion and its holy book/s. Even sincere believers will stress different parts of their religion while ignoring others, and will sometimes knowingly break their own rules. Islam, and religion in general, is not the sole nor even the major factor behind people's actions, good or bad. To be honest, we're not completely sure how to explain human behavior exactly. Is it environment? Socialization? Genetics? All of these are a part of the whole complex situation. But that's the thing to remember: human behavior and motivation is complex. If one wants to understand it, one should take into account all of the forces acting on human beings and not settle for juvinile explanations like "religion made him do it!" This is no more valid than "video games made him do it" or "heavy metal made him do it." It's so much more complex than that, and it really does a disservice to posit such non-answers, because it prevents us from getting to the core of the problem (and thus potentially figuring out a way of solving it). Far too many people get away with these sorts of explanations these days, not only about Islam, but everything. Please, dear reader, be more critical than that. Religion does not always cause people to do good. We have plenty of evidence of that. Neither, however, does it always cause people to do evil. There is plenty of evidence of that as well (millions of Muslims who are NOT terrorists is pretty substantial). The relationship between belief and action is much more intricate, and it demands serious study, not dismissive or degrading non-explanations, no matter how good they might feel.

Myth 4: The Muslims took slaves.
This isn't a myth per se, as it is quite true that Islam allows for slavery (allows does not mean requires) and indeed there were plenty of slaves in the Islamic world for most of its history. The myth is in the representation, usually juxtaposed to the "free" West of today, and often with the connotation for non-experts in the New World that the slavery of the East was equivilent to the chattal slavery of our own side of the Atlantic. Neither of these views is true. So, I would like to set the record straight about the nature of slavery in Islam.
The first point is on the juxtaposition of an East which allowed slavery vs. a West which did not. Truly, this is comparing apples to oranges, or more accurately, a pre-modern society to a modern one (in the case of the United States, one which has only been without slavery for less than 150 years). In the days of the Ottoman empire, people often site the barbary pirates who often took their victims as slaves. This is true. It was also standard practice at the time. Recall that Europe was heavily invested in the slave trade almost since the discovery of the New World, important shiploads of African slaves (many of whom were Muslim) to work themselves to death in the mines and plantations of the Americas. Additionally, European navies and pirates battling the barbary corsairs were not loathe to take captives of their own to either ransom or sell into slavery. On the whole, the amount of slave taking and slave trading engaged in by the Europeans far outnumbered anything that the barbary corsairs were even capable of doing, let alone would actually have a market for (in the Middle East during the days of the Ottomans, slave ownership was very expensive, and very few individuals besides the most wealthy could afford to own any slaves at all. Statistics show that slaves were a small part of the population, in contrast to certain areas of the European controlled Americas which had enormous slave populations).
The second point is to demonstrate that slavery, although terrible, was not the same as it was in the Americas. In the southern continent, slaves were often worked to death. In the slaves states of the US, this was not entirely true, but slaves did work under appaling conditions. In both cases, slaves had practically no rights, were at the complete whims of their masters, were slaves for life, and any children they had were automatically slaves themselves. It was literally treating people as property. Slavery in the Islamic world was not like this at all. To be sure, it was not pleasant, but slaves under Islam did possess certain rights and had to be treated in a certain way. Although they were mostly at the whims of their masters, they were not entirely. Slavery in the East was a social class, not a statement of non-humanhood as it was in the Americas. And, it certainly was not based on race or color.
A few examples to illustrate this are as follows. I already mentioned that only the wealthy could afford to own slaves in the Ottoman Empire. This means that the vast majority of slaves were in charge of domestic tasks, not assigned to backbreaking labor on plantations or mines. They were basically servants, and although lesser than their owners, were often seen as a part of the family household. This is demonstrated by numerous examples of slave owners occasionally freeing their servants after a period of service, often times setting them up with a parcel of land or money, granting them inheretence proportional to all other family members, and so forth. Some fathers even married their (former) slaves to their children. Slavery was not seen as something inherent or inborn, as Europeans tended to view Africans, nor was it an unconditional situation from which a person could never be free. This in no means justifies it, or any legal hierarchy for that matter. But the point is that a slave was merely a notch in the social hierarchy, and what makes it despicable to us is the inequality inherent in any hierarchy, not the dehumanizing brutality which characterized European-style slavery in the New World.
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that a slave in the Ottoman Empire could attain a large degree of power and social status, since status often was gleaned from one's patron (or in this case, owner). Slaves of the Sultan could weild immense power. For instance, the Cheif Eunuch, having such close access to the Sultan's private chambers, could and did influence the royal family in many ways which even high-ranking viziers and officials could not. Further, the entire Janisary core of soldiers and officials were technically slaves (and also technically illegally so, as Islam forbids a Muslim from enslaving another Muslim). This core formed a powerful group in its own right, and there are plenty of examples in history of the Janisaries affecting politics by bribing, threatening, or in one case even murdering the Sultan. No slave in the Americas ever had as much power over his masters, let alone his nation, as the Janisary core did. Now, of course, not all slaves were lucky enough to be a part of the Janisaries. But, the point is to illustrate an entirely different concept of slavery, one in which social station is more important than race, humanness, and all of the other issues which came to define the chattal slavery of the New World. It was entirely different, perhaps no less detestable, but none-the-less different. This is an important point which many non-experts, often with ulterior motives, fail to mention when trying to persuade their audiences. The point is not to compare apples to oranges, and not to allow such liberal use of poorly defined yet loaded words to slip by unnoticed or unexamined. And to remember this point, it is enough to recall that the most famous Arab hero of all time in popular literature and tales was Antara, a former slave. And this was true even during the time of legal slavery. It illustrates that slaves were never considered sub-human animals or of a lesser breed as they were in the Americas. Slaves were simply human beings who fell into a specific social catagory, one which may change at any time. This fundamental conceptual difference is critical.

Myth 5: Authority = correct
This one should come as a no-brainer as well, but it is worth mentioning that certain figures who claim to be authorities on Islam or Islamic history are not necessarily accurate all of the time. For this, I wish to analyze this website, http://hnn.us/articles/16536.html, which contains myths of Islam "debunked" by the author and professor Timothy Furnish. First of all, I've never heard of the guy before, which is a bad sign. For the most part, I've at least heard of the top Western scholars in the feild of Islamic or Middle Eastern history. This guy is not one of them. Further, the website touts his book published by Preager. Personally, I've had very bad experiences with books they publish. But in any case, that's not something that a non-expert in the feild would really know about. These are but warning signs to me, and as usual, the proof of the ineptitude is in the writing itself.
For the most part, the material isn't really that objectionable. With past deconstructions, it was almost as if I could throw a dart and hit something false or misleading. This time, I actually had to look, although not very hard. Here is the first stupidity:
"Actually, the Crusades, 1095-1291, were simply the first time that European Christians managed to take the fight to their enemy’s territory."
Wow, here's a great example of trying to hide a logical absurdity within a non-relevant fact (in this case, the dates of the Crusades). His statement implies that the war between Muslims and Christendom had some long and unending history of which the Crusades were only a retaliation. This is bogus. Muslim gains in Europe had long been over by this time, and although there was the Reconquista occuring in Spain (against a dynasty was no longer expansionistic), this was not the focus of Pope Urban II's call to arms. The real history of the Crusades, as experts point out, has its roots in the Cluny monastary, where Pope Urban studied. There, a new idea of monstatic-style piety came to fore: the idea of reforming the rest of society to be more like monks, especially those in the "secular" church (at this time, referring to the non-monastic clergy). Pope Urban's speech is rife with the rhetoric of this movement, known as the Cluny Reforms, calling upon warrior monks to spread piety and serve the faith and so forth. This, of course, had a great social motivation as well. At the time, warlords in Europe were constantly fighting one another, leaching wealth from their populaces, and using said wealth to spread even more chaos and destruction for their own petty gains. The Crusades, in many ways, was a means of directing this hostility outwards against perceived "infidels," as opposed to fellow Christians. Urban II had to shame his listeners into viewing themselves as sinful for their deeds, and then convince them to sell most (if not all) of their wealth to make an armed "pilgrimage" to the Holy Land with the promise of a plenary indulgence if they did so. The point of the Crusades, on just reading Urban's speech, seems to have been to get a bunch of bloodthirsty warlords out of Europe, make them suffer for their sins (on a hard and perilous journey), and maybe even retake the Holy Land. It was not in the main a call to fight back against a four hundred year old conquest of one part of Europe.
Then, of course, there was the political maneuvering behind the seens. Part of the impetus behind the Crusades was an appeal from the Byzantine Emperor to fight the Turks. This particular Emperor hoped simply to gain back some land after the disasterous Battle of Manzikert by using the Crusaders basically as unpaid mercenaries, and maybe even use them to defeat some of his own rivals within the Empire itself (this would become a major factor in the Fourth Crusade, which never made it past Constantinople because it was caught up in Byzantine political struggles from the very beginning). Of course, the plan backfired as European lords gobbled up lands in the Levant for themselves, taking as much loot as they could along the way.
In any case, the author's words imply some sort of reified or real border between Christendom and Islam, as if these were united territories, and some clear motivation of an ongoing defensive war. None of these things was true. Both the Middle East and Europe were conglomerations of petty states and large states, different peoples of different faiths, and all with shifting borders and mentalities. Nothing was perfectly defined in this period of history in terms of geo-politics, and in fact this was a time of great instability (part of the lack of a coherent "Muslim" response to the first Crusade was the struggle between the Fatimid Caliph of Egypt and the Abbasid Caliph of Baghdad, not to mention the various semi-autonomous Turkish rulers in Anatolia). The real motivations behind the Crusades were complex, and different each time, and had much more to do with contemporary social, economic, and political factors than some abstract notion of an eternal struggle between Christianity and Islam. This latter idea is merely a fabrication of orientalist scholars with clear political agendas. It's nonsense, and it does not match up to historical fact or proper historical methodology. It's another one of those non-answers so popular in the discourse these days.
Here's another tidbit of stupidity: "Another fairy tale about Islam is that poverty produces terrorists... Most of the 9/11 and London bombers were university-educated and at least middle-class. The same is true for Palestinian suicide bombers and most likely those in Iraq... Poverty may be necessary, but it is hardly sufficient, to explain Islamic terrorism."
He does not seem to even know what he is arguing here. First, "poverty" is a very relative term, not just objectively but subjectively. Class consciousness is partially a function of the relative distribution of wealth, and a function of how people perceive themselves (which is not always factually accurate). He claims these people were middle class. According to whom and what? Did they see themselves as such? Furthermore, class is not a static station, expecially true in regions under global and domestic pressures (such as dictatorships), where oppression can cause a number of disasters in people's lives. I must admit that the 1 to 1 correlation of poverty and crime is a non-answer, but it is no reason to entirely dismiss any and all social or economic investigation. When simplistic answers are proven false, it demands sophisticated analysis, not just a different simplistic answer. And finally, his last statement is completely reversed. If poverty were necessary for terrorism, it would be expressed as this conditional: "If one is a terrorist, then one is poor." This is exactly the argument the author seeks to disprove by demonstrating you can have a non-poor terrorist (modus tolens). I wonder if he stopped to think about this when he wrote it, or if the website even bothered to edit it before they put it online. It may be just a simple error, and I have no evidence otherwise, but it still demonstrates yet again the inexplicable phenomenon of basic logic flying out the window when discussing Islam and its history.
And finally I'd like to discuss some points on his last "myth." First, we have the typical equation of Wahhabism with puritanism, two religious expressions which are entirely different from one another, least of all because one came from Islam and the other from Christianity. There is too much to go into here, so a reader interested in Wahhabism should check out David Commins' book, "The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia." Also, there is this statement: "Also, Islamic history is replete with Muslim scholars whom the modern Islamic fundamentalists draw upon." In all my studies of modernist Islam, I've only heard two jurists particularly mentioned: al-Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyyah, the former of which is typically only used as an inspiration for general reform, and was a favorite of the much more liberal-minded reformer Rashid Rida. Ibn Taymiyyah, on the other hand, is used extensively, specifically his fatwa against the Mongols of the Ilkhanate in the 14th century. Aside from this, modernist trends actually tend to dismiss the bulk of juridical literature since the time of the Prophet. Indeed, this is what Islamic fundamentalism is all about: abandoning later interpretations and seeking the Qur'an and the Hadith alone for legal reasoning. I.e., getting back to the "fundamentals" of the faith. On Ibn Taymiyyah, the author writes, "The most famous is Ibn Taymiyah who, 700 years before George Bush said “you’re either for us or against us,” divided the world into the domain of Islam and that of war." This is absurd, and possibly an outright lie. First of all, I've never seen any such absolutist distinction in Ibn Taymiyyah. To be fair though, I'm only really familiar with his anti-Mongol fatwa, but as mentioned before, this was the critical one for modern fundamentalists (especially those justifying the killing of civilians). In this case, the absolutism described is in the fatwa, but as an accusation against the Mongols, not a statement made by Ibn Taymiyyah about Islam! Here I'll explain with an exceprt from a seminar paper I wrote (and note I'm working from a secondary source; I once tried to get a copy of the fatwa in the original Arabic, but the only library on ILL that had one was in Germany, and they weren't parting with it):
" His [Ibn T's] first goal in the fatwa was to dispel the common notion of the historical analogy between the current conflict [between the Mamluks and the Ilkhanate] and the conflict between the Companions of the Prophet during the Battle of the Camel and the Battle of Siffin, and replace it with analogy of the war between the Companions and kharijites (deviants), thus leaving no “moral high ground” of non-participation.[1] Therefore, he also had to prove the deviance of the Khan Ghazan as well as his followers [mostly fellow Muslims, including Ghazan]. To do so, he argues that the shari‘a is not consistently applied in the Ilkhanate, but rather mixed with the pagan yasa of Genghis Khan. Furthermore, he argued that the religious tolerance shown in the Mongol Empire was contrary to Islam, which was supposed to be held in higher esteem than all others, and thus was a leftover pagan innovation.[2] Finally, and perhaps most famously, he writes, “They [the Mongols] have divided people (of the world) into four categories… their friend, their foe, the scholar and the commoner.”[3] The significance of these words lies in that, by their own admission (supposedly), all those who bend to their will are their friends, and all who do not their enemies. Thus, the only people serving the Mongols are those who recognize the supremacy of their rule and laws over and above the demands of the Islamic faith. Therefore, it is permissible to fight and kill even Muslims, for by serving a false ruler who draws such distinctions, one is contributing to his irreligious ways."
All quotes and notes from:
Thomas Raff, Remarks on an Anti-Mongol Fatwa by Ibn Taymiya (Leiden: 1973), pp. 40-53
Ibn Taymiyyah was forced to confront the fact that it is not lawful to declare war on Muslims with the fact that the Ilkhanate was a mainly Muslim army. How do you justify killing Muslims? He argued that the Ilkhanate basically says either you are with us or against us, and kills anyone who does not support them (actually true in practice). So, the only people left are those who directly support the Ilkhanate, and not, say, people who quietly disagree but can't speak out, people who resist, etc. Thus, by demonstrating the Ilkhanate was not really Muslim (another difficult task given that Ghazan was a Muslim, so he had to make up the thing about the imposition of Shari'a, which was just as true of a criticism against the Mamluk government he supported in the conflict). Thus, together, you have a justification for killing fellow Muslims. Or civilians, or people who support governments that do not enforce the Shari'a to your liking, etc. As one can see, this is obviously a very popular justification among the more extreme elements. The fatwa itself was particular to its historical context, but certainly opened the door for much more than that. Ibn Taymiyyah could only have had in mind the motivation of getting people to take up arms against an invading Mongol Muslim army. He most likely did not have in mind people flying passanger jets into buildings. Notice also how huge of a faux pas it was for Georgie to say something as ignorant as "either you are with us or you are with the terrorists." It walked right into the justification Osama bin Laden and his ilk claimed for their holy war against the American people.
And finally, we have this little number from the author: " Islam is where Christianity was before the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) and then the Enlightenment led the West to divorce religion and state, thereby removing (mostly) the threat of religious-based warfare." I shouldn't even have to comment on this one, and a credentialed scholar like Mr. Furnish should really know better. I'll try brefly to demolish it: 1. Putting Islam on a European history timeline is not only factually inaccurate but also rests on the myth of the Grand Narrative which has been debunked as false and racist for decades 2. Many European nations continued to have after the TYW until today an official state religion, and even in America there is a constant attempt (sometime mildly successful) of breaking down the separation of church and state 3. Religious based conflict in general still occurs in the West, and even secular wars were given religious overtones. After all, Hitler claimed he was on a mission from God to destroy the Jews. Of course, historians instantly recognize this (rightly) as political pandering, and search rather in the economic, social, and cultural history of Germany for the rise of Naziism and the Holocaust. Yet, a Muslim leader can say essentially the same thing, that his religion commands him to kill such-and-such, and people automatically assume its a statement of sincere zealotry divorced from historical circumstances. Why is that? Why is it different for a Christian than a Muslim in our society, even among people (supposed scholars) who really should know better? Why is it when the discussion of Islam comes up, time and again logic and fact get thrown out the window, and the West is presented as "better" than it really is/was and the Middle East as worse? Or, even more devastating, vice versa, with a demonized West and an overglorified East? Why is it that even credentialed scholars have trouble just sticking to the facts, or even exercising basic logic, the minute the subject of Islam comes up?

So, there's a few myths busted. On the whole, I don't find Islam particularly appealing. Like all religions, its conception as a "divine" document has the tendency to allow people to do all kinds of disgusting things and find justification for them, while at the same time blurring rational thought under the guise of sacredness. This can happen any time one makes an idol of an ideology. In my opinion, the Qur'an is a well-intentioned and well-composed piece of literature written by a man named Muhammad, who apparently had a knack for language and inspiring people with it (which if one knows the history of Arabic poetry, one knows this is not an uncommon combination of traits). Some ideas presented in it were revolutionary, some still even valid today, while others are either ludicrous or simply dated to a particular time and place. It's no different than any other tract of human-wrought knowledge in that regard. If this were all, then I think it would be fine, as people could simply discuss, think, disagree with, or even amend the ideas presented. But that's not the situation. Despite some wonderful wiggle room for jurists using ijtihad, Islam cannot shake the fact that it is presented as a divine document, unchangeable, and perfect.
And yet, Islam will continue to change with times and people. But, this is the real danger of modern times: with fundamentalists and reformers of all stripes claiming their interpretation as the "true" Islam, they have an undeserved and unquestioned claim to a divine authority that no secular scholar could ever command of his subject matter. No idea is more dangerous than the one which changes unconsciously and unquestioningly, with a higher authority supposedly behind it. It's like a mental Russian roulette. This does nothing good for the progress of society or people, and ends up in the same place as all other fallacies, falsehoods, and childishly simple answers: as an excuse to not think. Muslims today would do well to remember that even the Imams of the four major rites saw Islam as very open to interpretation, and that interpretation was always a difficult and uncertain task, sometimes even perilous. It is with this concept in mind that Rashid Rida (and his mentor Muhammad Abduh, and many like them) formulated a very liberal, very modern, and very peaceful conception of Islam. Of course, even he had his biases as well. But what does it matter if a great thinker isn't perfect all the time? Marx fudged his history, Nietzsche fudged his philology, and even Edward Said took people's quotes completely out of context from time to time. That's why we don't make idols out of them or treat them as if they were sacred: by getting rid of the false authority, we can sift through the wrong to get at the right. We can keep the discussion open, as al-Razi did with Galen, and potentially find some real progress. Muslims would do well to remember that even Muhammad was just a man, and never claimed otherwise.
So, if Islam can remain an open religion, one which embraces change, re-interpretation, and even argument, then it may be possible to avoid some of the absurdities which have cropped up in the religion in the past several decades. At the very least, it might clear the air a little, and open up some more stimulating and constructive dialog. If Islam does not remain open, but rather becomes more close-minded, then it will continue to stir the economic, social, and political shit-pot in the contemporary Middle East, making a tense situation even worse without providing any substantive answers.

Peace in the Middle East

As a student of Middle Eastern and Arab history, this question of peace has invariably crossed my path. "What is the solution?" I am often asked, as if my knowledge of history would give me some divine foresight into events to come. I am no prophet, and I can make no such estimations of the future. However, I can provide what insight is available to us based on past information. Though it may not confirm our ideas, it may, at the least, inform them.

What follows is a research paper composed for a class on Modern Israel in which I grapple with the question of two states versus one in a historical context, particularly focusing on Mandatory Palestine. I firmly believe in its contents, but this does not compromise the "objectivity" of the report. As will become clear, the purpose is not to convince, but to instruct and inform. My hope is that anyone reading this will be able to understand and apply its lessons in the way they see fit, and to ultimately find an understanding above all else. There is no "solution" presented in this report, and any attempts to divine one would be to miss the point. There is a deeper wisdom to be gained from history, and I hope that this admittedly imperfect essay will nevertheless help people come to understand that point.

Thus, I present:

Brit Shalom and the Bi-National Solution: An Inquiry into the Moral and Practical Substance of Rapprochement and History

You are forever exclaiming, “Perhaps yesterday your advice was sound, but now it is no longer valid. Today it is no longer possible; it no longer holds true. Today everything has changed!” And thus today has become yesterday and another yesterday…Always, in every situation, it is possible to do something, some correct undertaking, something which determines to some extent the face of the next hour, the character of the next situation. The conditions of action are constantly changing; there is always the obligation to do something else, something new, that is, to respond to a changing situation. But the correct response![1]

- Professor Martin Buber

Brit Shalom and its related bi-nationalist thinkers were often presented as idealists and moralists who failed to grasp the practical realities of the Jewish-Arab problem in Mandatory Palestine. The common rationale is that their bi-national idea, while admirable in theory, was nothing more than the moralizing of a small intellectual elite, and it ultimately was doomed to fail due to its failure to recognize the political and social realities of the time. Furthermore, this argument about the impracticality of the “one state solution” or any such rapprochement between Jews and Arabs has recurred time and again based on the argument of historical circumstances. Those interested in the possibility of peace between the two groups have often looked back upon these early efforts towards cooperation, and yet ultimately the standard line prevails: bi-nationalism was and is nothing more than an ideal, and never was a real possibility.

However, closer analysis reveals that this is an overly simplistic understanding of the movement. Indeed, many Brit Shalom and bi-nationalist thinkers had a keen perception for practice as well as theory, and they put their ideas into action (albeit with varying degrees of success). The contrast between the Realpolitik of mainline Zionist organizations such as the Histadrut and the theoretical and moral view of bi-nationalism is a false dichotomy, and in fact the two shared many similar sentiments in both ideology and practice. The difference, however, lies in that many mainline Zionist organizations drew a divide between the beliefs and goals of their public ideology from their private politics. The bi-nationalist thinkers such as Judah Magnes and Martin Buber, on the other hand, drew no such boundary in their own beliefs, and attempted to bridge moral ideals with practical politics. What resulted was an ideology that was both idealistic and realistic, and it was consistently so across public and private discourse.

The purpose of this essay is to examine the complexities of this theoretical-practical idea as it pertains to Brit Shalom and related thinkers. The goal is not to present a causal argument as to why the bi-national idea failed. Truly, such an explanation is beyond the scope of true history, and leads to overly simplistic views of the parties involved. Rather, Brit Shalom and the bi-nationalist phenomenon require a sophisticated understanding in order to properly place them in history and, if possible, learn from their successes and mistakes. This essay will attempt this task in three sections. First, it will give a background to the bi-nationalist idea. Second will be an analysis of the unique way in which it bridged theory and practice. Finally, there will be an analysis of the implicit mistrust and East/West dichotomy which nevertheless characterized thinkers dedicated towards understanding and unity. It is the hope of the author that these points and arguments will help clear the air of deterministic and ultimately destructive understandings of the past and replace them with an understanding useful to current thinkers wrestling with the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The conclusion reached here is that the history of the national question during Mandatory times, properly understood, can neither justify the advent or success of partition any more than it can justify the lack of success of the bi-national solution, whether in the past or in the future. Neither is historically determined to succeed or fail; they are determined by the human beings who dedicate themselves to being active agents in the full light of history.

Background

The ideology of Jewish and Arab cooperation has roots deep in the early stages of Zionism itself. Thinkers such as Ahad Ha’Am and Aharon David Gordon in particular stress the spiritual and moral aspect of Zionism over the political. The latter figure in particular stressed the importance of cooperation with Arabs in order to achieve Zionist ends. Their ideas would later have a profound influence on Martin Buber and other supporters of bi-nationalism. Buber himself stressed the moral side of Zionism over the grossly political. He believed that Zionism above all meant a cultural and spiritual rebirth for the Jews, and this therefore required peaceful interaction with other nations. To ignore the moral responsibilities of Jewish values would be to subvert the entire endeavor. Borrowing from Kantian deontology, Buber argued that one nation’s goals cannot trump another’s because nations are comprised of people who must morally be treated as ends in themselves, never as means to an end.[2] While Buber certainly held his own unique philosophical views, in general, many of the thinkers associated with Brit Shalom and bi-nationalism shared similar sentiments towards the moral nature of Zionism, and as such viewed cooperation not just as a potential solution to the “Arab question,” but as a moral imperative.

Brits Shalom was founded in 1925 after an impassioned speech by Joseph Horowitz calling for Jews to cooperate with Arabs and become more “Eastern” in outlook in order to resist the divisive influences of Arab nationalism and Islamic revivalism.[3] The organization was established as a sort of think-tank for research into the Arab problem and the possibilities of cooperation and understanding. Though participation in Brit Shalom was small, it featured such thinkers as Arthur Ruppin, Hans Kohn, and Chaim Kalvarisky, among others. Judah Magnes, though often connected to the group, was never actually a member, citing a potential conflict of interests with his position as head of the Hebrew University.[4] However, Magnes would remain a close colleague to many of the Brit Shalom thinkers.

Immediately, Brit Shalom members recognized the uniqueness of the venture. In a letter to Hans Kohn, Ruppin expresses the difficulty of “bring[ing] the Jews as a second nation into a country which is already settled by a nation – and fulfill this through peaceful means.”[5] Ruppin notes in this letter that previously, such events were imposed through force. Thus, Brit Shalom had to be willing to put their ideas into both practical and peaceful action. Throughout its existence, the group sponsored many initiatives towards Jewish and Arab cooperation, especially among workers. To this end, they endeavored to set up unions with the joint efforts of other Jewish groups, especially those with socialist aspirations. Mainly, however, Brit Shalom focused its efforts on educating Jews about Arab culture and attempting to foster understanding within the Jewish community.[6]

After the Arab riots of 1929, Brit Shalom came under heavy attack from Zionist leaders and newspapers. Brit Shalom was even accused of siding with the Arabs.[7] Yet, the riots seemed to further the resolve of several Brit Shalom thinkers in the necessity of peaceful cooperation and communication in order to avoid more bloodshed. Still, the public outcry seemed to spell doom for the group itself, and the organization was abandoned by about 1933. However, bi-nationalism would resurface again under different banners all the way up until the declaration of the state of Israel.

The 1936 riots once again demonstrated the urgent need for peaceful negotiation, and thus in the same year a group known as Kedmah Mizraha was founded. In many ways, this organization “was regarded by many as a continuation of Brit Shalom,” because, “it did include most of the ex-Brit Shalom membership,” except for Ruppin who had become disillusioned with bi-nationalism by this time.[8] This group differed from Brit Shalom in that it stressed communication with Arabs as a primary objective, and thus targeted its efforts more towards the Arab leadership than the Jewish. However, it was very short-lived.

The advent of the Second World War actually saw a marked increase in attempts at Jewish-Arab cooperation, and many committees were set up with regard to this. Among these was The League of Rapprochement and Cooperation in 1942, again with many former Brit Shalom members, but this time including others such as Buber and Magnes. Shortly thereafter, the League founded the Ihud (unity) party as a bloc to include other political groups along with the League itself. There was some cooperation with other organizations, both Jewish and Arab, but generally the cooperation was limited. The group was especially concerned with the politics, and dedicated itself to arguing for bi-nationalism and parity against the idea of partition which had been growing in support since the Peel Commission report in 1937. Perhaps one of its most famous activities was an appearance by Magnes, Buber, and Moses Smilansky before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in 1946. The three laid down a detailed, practical plan for parity in Palestine, and though the Committee was sympathetic, little was accomplished. In fact, their efforts brought criticism from both Jews and Arabs. On the former side, newspaper articles lambasted Magnes and his comrades. Israel Cohen especially criticized them as a “’private initiative’ and without any worthy public authorizing them.”[9] On the other side, several Arab sources argued that the plan was fundamentally flawed because no real trust or sense of unity existed among the two nations.[10] Magnes was, in many ways, even considered a dangerous thinker due to his propensity to act on his own rather than through officially recognized political channels.

Perhaps the final blow to the idea was the incident involving Fawzi Darwish Al-Husseini and his “Falastine al-Jadidah” organization. This Arab group was willing to meet secretly with the League for Rapprochement and Cooperation in 1946 in order to rally support among Arabs for bi-nationalism against more powerful Arab ideologues, but the cooperation between the groups fell apart after Al-Husseini’s assassination in the same year. As Susan Lee Hattis observes, “his murder was a warning to any Arab who might choose the same path.”[11] Partition then became a reality with the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, and since that time the idea of unity between Palestinians and Israelis has become nothing more than ideal which is seldom given serious consideration.

Ideals and Reality

The bi-nationalists, especially Buber and Magnes, have met with a variety of criticism for the ideas and activities both in their time and since. They have often been criticized for being too idealistic, out of touch with realities, and even dangerous in their activities. These criticisms were often direct, but sometimes they were more backhanded in nature. For instance, historian Tom Segev comments in a recent book that “Brit Shalom confronted Zionist ideology with its conscience,”[12] implying that the only real goal or effect of Brit Shalom was an abstract moral one, a sort of gnawing guilt on Zionism rather than an active and acting force in the realities of Mandatory Palestine. Writing in the 1970s, historian Susan Lee Hattis takes a more direct approach, saying that, “Considerations of universal justice may motivate certain group activities but more usually such considerations will at best act as a brake to absolute egotism.”[13] Hattis recognizes here at least some practical activity on the part of bi-nationalists, but she boils their goals down to an abstracted idea of “universal justice,” and like Segev, relegates their effects to essentially one of a moral conscious, i.e. a “brake to absolute egotism.” She dismisses the practicality of bi-nationalist ideas, both in Mandatory times and her own, as unrealistic given political realities, suspicion, and human nature. In a sense, she seems to think bi-nationalism was doomed to fail. Finally, as mentioned before, contemporaries of Brit Shalom also actively slammed Magnes, Buber, and other bi-nationalists for varying reasons and especially regarded their ideas as dangerous. Segev notes, “In the Jewish Agency the common wisdom was that the peace initiatives of Magnes and his associates should be treated gingerly, lest they reveal the fact that the Zionists were not united. Any evidence of a schism could lead the Arabs to take a harder line.”[14] It seemed that many Jews worried that Brit Shalom and similar groups would be interpreted as a splinter group to Zionism, not only implying that Zionism was disunited, but also that, unlike Brit Shalom, mainline Zionism was not for cooperation with Arabs. And, as mentioned above, there was a particular distaste for the activists’ tendencies towards “private initiative” that perhaps gave Zionism a bad image among Arabs.

All of these criticisms, taken together, demonstrate a subtle but interesting implication, which can be framed as this question: If the bi-nationalists were nothing more than ideologues and out of touch with reality, was there really a reason to fear their activities? The very idea suggests activity and activism, not the idle musings of some abstract “conscience of Zionism.” Magnes and his compatriots had drawn criticism not simply for their morals, but their methods, especially talking to Committees, political groups, and Arab leaders. Magnes in particular drew heavy criticism and even protests after word of his secret and infamous negotiations with H. St. John Philby came out in the Jewish press.[15] There seems to be the implicit assumption that the bi-nationalists had substantial goals that, whether misguided or not, were being put to practice. The ideas of the bi-nationalists, especially Magnes and Buber, were indeed moralistic and idealistic. But, these ideals were also put into practical action. Their ideas were thus far more complicated than a simple idealistic vs. realistic dichotomy. Indeed, they attempted to bridge theory and practice, and they did so publicly as well as privately. Unlike many other “practical” Zionist groups, there was no divide between public ideology and private Realpolitik.

Bi-nationalist thinkers were not unaware of the necessity of practical activity. A short quote from Magnes, “let us build while others talk,” captures concisely the attitude of many Brit Shalom thinkers and their affiliates.[16] Magnes believed that practical action was, in a sense, logically necessitated by abstract principles. He stated in his essay, “Stand of the Palestinian Jews,” that, “It is fatuous to think that good-will can be engendered through abstract formulas. Good-will can come through life, through the creation of common interests vital to both peoples. Active, responsible participation in government is perhaps the most important of these common interests.”[17] To Magnes, active cooperation had to precede understanding and unity. In many ways, this is the antithesis of certain criticisms of bi-nationalist policy that claimed it impractical because no unity yet existed. But, this was not Magnes’ goal, nor was it Brit Shalom’s. Rather, the goal was to create unity through action. Magnes writes, “Proposing that good-will first appear and that only then the two peoples can come together, is putting the cart before the horse.”[18] These ideas were also expressed in the nature of the Brit Shalom movement, which was united less by ideology than by desire for practical action. Hattis remarks, “Brit Shalom had no ideology; bi-nationalism, they said, is not the ideal but the reality, and if this reality is not grasped Zionism will fall.”[19] This is consistent with later accusations by numerous bi-nationalists that the failure of cooperation to take root is the fact that policy failed to develop “self-governing institutions,” which would foster cooperation.[20] Hashomer Hatzair, a fellow group of the League for Rapprochement and Cooperation, in particular blamed the British government for subverting efforts to establish joint Jewish-Arab unions.[21] There may be some basis for this last point, as early efforts by Brit Shalom to form the “Achvat Poalim” joint Jewish-Arab union in 1930 fell through when the British Mandatory government refused to accept their registration on account of suspected communist activities.[22] Whether these efforts would have worked or not, it is clear that practical action was an integral, necessary part of the theoretical framework. Magnes especially believed in the necessity of establishing joint political committees and legislatures in the post-Mandate country. He claimed before the Anglo-American Committee that, “no side can afford for long to withhold its adherence [to the proposed organizations of a bi-national Palestinian government]. The demands of life itself, the insistence of the people would be too strong.”[23] Magnes’ idea was that a bi-national government would be forced to cooperate in order to accomplish anything, and that the social, economic, and cultural need for government action would fuel this cooperation. Buber shared Magnes’ logic, but focused especially on the need to create a “Land Policy,” or dedication to the social and economic growth of Palestine (not simply the Yishuv) in order to foster good will.[24] Again, though, Buber had his own particular and complex philosophy for supporting bi-nationalism. Yet, it is important to note what separated Buber (and many bi-nationalists) from most Zionist political parties was in the “assessment of the political relevance of the moral aspect of the Arab question.”[25] Buber based his politics on moral grounds, but his morals necessitated a political and practical dimension. Indeed, he shunned Realpolitik, and asserted the unity of ideals and political action. So, regardless of the particular philosophies brought to bear on the issues of bi-nationalism, it is reasonable to say that the movement expressed a clear link between ideology and practical reality, and these thinkers did so consistently.

In many ways, this nature of the bi-nationalists is contrasted by the more common politics at the time, which tended to draw a sharp divide between public ideologies on the one hand, and private practicality and pragmatism on the other. This led to an interesting development among Zionist leaders of occasionally supporting the bi-nationalists ideas, both in theory and practice. However, privately they seemed to hold an agenda that was ultimately not compatible with genuine rapprochement.

Mendes-Flohr notes that, “most Zionists were painfully aware of the Arab presence in Palestine, and not infrequently this awareness reflected genuine moral anguish.”[26] For many Jews, cooperation and peace with the Arabs was an obvious moral concern, one not exclusive to bi-nationalists. High profile Zionists like Ben-Gurion and even Chaim Weizmann seem to have supported negotiations with the Arabs.[27] Chaim Arlozoroff, later head of the Jewish Agency, even declared in a 1922 speech that, “There is no other way except the setting up of a common state in Palestine for Jews and Arabs as equal nations in their rights.”[28] It is even suggested that the rejection of the idea of parity by the World Zionist Organization in 1931 was a direct cause of Weizmann’s resignation as president of that organization.[29] Although this was part of the public discourse, many Zionist leaders had somewhat incompatible agendas privately. These agendas tended to revolve around the push for Jewish interests, in economics and in demographics, and this seemed to underlie efforts for collaboration that otherwise might seem consistent with bi-nationalists’ ideas.

To illustrate this point, it is helpful to look at the efforts of Jewish labor, particularly the Histadrut, in organizing joint Jewish-Arab unions. Ben-Gurion pushed for joint labor early on during the Mandate,[30] and the Histadrut even helped to secretly found Arab workers clubs after the 1929 riots.[31] These activities actually seem in line with Brit Shalom thinking, as they would presumably help foster cooperation and good will among Jews and Arabs. Further, there is no evidence to suggest that Ben-Gurion and other leaders did not genuinely desire or expect such an outcome. However, secret loyalties and agendas tended to sour the supposed outcome of such policies. Historian Anita Shapiro argues that the fundamental goal of these policies was actually to support Jewish labor, with little real concern for Arabs. To make her point, she argues that Jewish laborers, having come from a more affluent European background, expected a higher level of working conditions and pay than did Arab workers.[32] Arab workers were able and willing to work for less, thus making them more competitive than Jews in the labor force. Thus, the underlying idea behind organizing Arab labor was to help Arabs raise their wages to the level of Jews, thus making Jews as competitive in the labor market.[33] While this may be a cynical analysis, it does seem consistent with some of the evidence regarding Histadrut’s involvement in joint railway workers’ unions. In this area, cooperative unions actually met with an unusual amount of success. Arab workers approached Jewish workers on the basis of cooperation, and some even asked to join the Histadrut.[34] These Arab unionists seemed to oppose other Arab ideologues, and “generally ignored or resisted pressure from the Palestinian nationalist movement to terminate cooperation with Jewish unionists.”[35] Although this was not the norm among workers outside the Palestinian Railway, this example would at least seem to supply exactly what the bi-nationalists and the Histadrut wanted to accomplish. However, the issue of Arabs joining the Histadrut was a particularly contentious idea. Historian Zachary Lockman writes, “The admission of Arabs to the Histadrut or its constituent trade unions, or even their organization into separate unions under the Histadrut’s tutelage, was likely to conflict with the long term goal of increasing Jewish employment; and once organized, the Arab workers might not be controllable.”[36] This seems consistent with the Histadrut’s later policy of trying to organize exclusively Arab unions and clubs unaffiliated with the Histadrut, a policy that particularly angered many Arab Railway workers who shunned political and religious division.[37] Eventually, the joint union idea and Jewish-Arab worker cooperation receded and fell apart.

It would seem that Ben-Gurion and the Histadrut had secondary motives that hindered the success of these attempts at rapprochement. The argument that the aim had always been the benefit of Jewish labor seems plausible, but ultimately the real motives are unknown. Still, it is enough to illustrate that the politics of the day seemed to revolve around split loyalties to incompatible causes that never seemed to come out publicly. This reality also manifested itself with regards to the issue of Jewish immigration and the creation of a Jewish majority in Palestine. This was a core element in much Zionist ideology of the time, and it only occasionally dawned upon Zionists that it was incompatible with addressing Arab grievances. Chaim Arlozoroff declared that, “we cannot rattle 10 times a day into the ears of the Arabs the slogan about a Jewish majority in Palestine, while wanting to reach an agreement with them.”[38] It seems as though Zionists had fairly split priorities, and these manifested themselves variously in the public and private discourse. Taken together, one can imagine that Zionists were sending a very mixed message to Arabs. On the one hand, there were offers of cooperation, joint unions, and understanding, while on the other there were slogans, declarations about establishing a Jewish majority, split unions, and denial of Arab workers into Jewish organizations such as the Histadrut. This does not seem to be the case with bi-nationalists, who consistently tended to support joint labor as well as cooperation and consolidation between Jewish and Arab political groups (though, as the case of Fawzi Darwish demonstrates, little became of these efforts). Taken together, it seems there was a sharp divide between the approaches of a group like the Histadrut and the bi-nationalists. The former drew a dichotomy between both theory and practices, resulting in conflicting and often confusing activities with questionable motives. The bi-nationalists, on the other hand, tended to bridge theory and practice, resulting in seemingly more consistent activities, or at least ones which leave less room for questioning their motives. This, however, is not to make a point on which approach is better. Though both met with some success, they ultimately failed at garnering Arab support. The issue here is simply understanding and appreciating the intricacies of the Arab question, and highlighting the major differences in concept between many bi-nationalists and other groups of Zionists. On the surface, both tended to take similar practical measures, such as setting up joint unions. However, the critical difference lies in that one group practiced within a divided framework of public ideology and private practicality, whereas the other drew no such distinction. This distinction is not to be taken lightly, as it illustrates in part why bi-nationalist thinkers were open to criticism both of being too idealistic while at the same time criticized for their practical efforts. Both sides were represented publicly (such as speaking before the Anglo-American Committee) as well as privately (such as Magnes’ secret negotiations with Philby). This distinguishing characteristic also provides a better understanding of the bi-nationalist position as opposed to that of more “pragmatic” groups. The difference does not lie in practicality vs. ideology or even in ideals vs. reality. Rather, the distinguishing feature is in how the relative groups resolved the two. This being the case, it is unfair to point to the bi-nationalists’ idealism as the reason for their failure, and it is also unreasonable to conclude that other groups, such as the Histadrut, were therefore more practical and more in touch with realities. Truly, the evidence here does not seem to suggest why any group “failed” while others “succeeded.” The issue is far more complex.

Inherent Mistakes

Also pursuant to the analysis of bi-nationalist ideas is pointing out shared sentiments between them and other groups at the time. What seems consistent throughout the discourse of both is an implied mistrust between Jews and Arabs. Neither Brit Shalom, the Histadrut, nor their Arab counterparts seemed to escape this fundamental difficulty. To illustrate this point, it is helpful to examine a story reportedly told to Magnes by an Arab Christian:

“A man was riding on his donkey and saw another man walking. He invited the man to ride with him. Mounting the donkey, the stranger said, “How fast your donkey is!” The two rode on for a while. When the stranger said, “How fast our donkey is!” the animal’s owner ordered the man to get off. “Why?” the stranger asked. “I’m afraid,” said the owner, “that you’ll soon be saying, ‘How fast my donkey is!’”[39]

This story, whether truly said or not, encapsulates the fear and mistrust surrounding the Jewish-Arab discourse during the Mandate period. It manifested itself mainly in the contentious issue of Jewish immigration, which many Arabs regarded as an attempt to create an exclusively Jewish state in Palestine despite overtures of cooperation. Furthermore, this idea of the Jews as “strangers” in the land of Palestine was, for both sides, a conflicting dichotomy representative of a conceptual East and West split between Jews (many of whom were émigrés from Europe) and native Palestinian Arabs. This conceptual split was inherent in the immigration issue and in the realities of Jewish-Arab joint labor. It was even endemic of the bi-nationalists, most notably in Magnes’ secret negotiations with Philby, the latter of whom was acting as a middle man between Magnes and certain Arab notables such as (supposedly) the Mufti of Jerusalem Hajj Amin. Throughout the discourse it seems clear that mistrust and fear were a common element in both the Jewish and Arab sides, and that the bi-nationalists themselves were not immune to this bias. And, this mistrust was indicative of a conceptual split between the East and the West.

First, the issue of Jewish immigration was an underlying assumption of much of the political rhetoric during the Mandatory era. Members of Brit Shalom recognized early on that the desire to create a Jewish majority in Palestine incited much of the Arab fears towards Zionism.[40] Yet, this desire to increase the population of the Yishuv remained a priority for both bi-nationalists and their Jewish opponents. Weizmann in particular noted in a 1930 letter, “While we accept the principle of equality… in the future Palestinian State, the Arabs press for having that state constituted immediately, because circumstances [of the population] would enable them to distort it into and Arab dominion,” and further, “we have come, are coming, and mean to come in increasing numbers.”[41] For Weizmann and many other Zionists, there was a fear that, if Palestine became a state before the Jewish population was significant in strength and size, then the Arabs would try to use their demographic advantage to dominate the Jews. Thus, it became a part of the mainline Zionist policy to push for immigration during the Mandate era in an effort to strengthen the Yishuv. This, of course, seemed to verify the fears of Arabs that the Jews intended to establish a Jewish majority and hence a Jewish state. Some Zionists sought to assuage the fear by proposing an agreement on equal representation, regardless of population, to ensure the rights of both Jews and Arabs. Moshe Shertok of the Jewish Agency wrote in 1936, “they [Arabs] have no right to demand that we should undertake to remain a minority… On the other hand we will be willing to discuss guarantees for non-domination and non-eviction.”[42] Here, Shertok expresses an apparent fear that a Jewish minority would lead to Arab dominance, and as a result, the eviction of the Jews from Palestine. Although Shertok was not a bi-nationalist, the latter group was in accord with his idea of an agreed national equality. As early as 1929, Magnes expressed his goal in the proposed agreement with Philby, stating, “There shall be freedom of immigration into Palestine, and more particularly of Arabs and Jews, subject to the economic capacity of the country to absorb such immigration.”[43] Although Magnes mentions both Arabs and Jews, it is clear that he had in mind the latter especially. In the revision of the draft by Philby’s Arab associates, Magnes highlights a significant change in the wording of this point, specifically, “The immigration to Palestine shall be free, especially to Arabs and Jews, subject to due regard for the interests of the country and economic capacity to absorb such immigration.”[44] It should be noted that this revision still includes the Magnes’ words on immigration complete with freedoms and restrictions, except with the insertion of the clause regarding the “interests of the country.” This seemingly innocuous phrase irked Magnes, prompting him to respond, “Mr. Philby’s Arab friends have here inserted a general phrase that would make Jewish immigration into the country more difficult than if the sole interest to be considered was the economic capacity of the country to absorb immigrants.”[45] Indeed, the phrase is extremely general, so much so that one wonders how Magnes could divine an ulterior motive for including it. Magnes gives no explicit rationale for his assumption, but it is interesting that he assumes such a general clause would automatically be used by the Arabs to subvert Jewish interests with regards to immigration. Such an assumption is not clear from the wording, but it was apparently clear to Magnes, thus suggesting that he was operating on an inherent mistrust of Arab motives with regards to Jews. Whether this mistrust was deserved, it was clearly a significant factor in these negotiations.

Magnes was not alone in his support for Jewish immigration and mistrust of Arab attempts to limit it. The League for Rapprochement and Cooperation laid down among its principles that “Jews have the right to immigrate to and settle in Palestine,” and that, “Non-domination of one people over the other, regardless of the numerical relationship between the two peoples.”[46] It is worth mentioning that at the time this was written (1942), the Jews were still a minority in Palestine. These statements beg the question: would the League make it a point to stress non-domination despite population figures if the Jews were a majority in Palestine? While the historical evidence is insufficient to answer such a question, it is still useful to consider that mistrust of an Arab majority may have been a basic assumption among the bi-nationalists at large during this period. This stress for Jewish immigration but representational equality regardless of demographics recurs throughout the arguments of bi-nationalist thinkers, and even among their opponents (as seen above). The motives behind this are dubious at best. Of course, this phenomenon went both ways. Many Arabs particularly stressed the importance of limiting Jewish immigration and expressed fears of what might result from a Jewish majority. The newspaper Falastin, among others, published Arabic translations of Brit Shalom ideas, but ultimately rejected the bi-nationalists’ ideas based on a desire to recognize an Arab majority in Palestine.[47] It seemed that neither side trusted the other to behave responsibly if it had the demographic advantage.

The Magnes-Philby negotiations provide an excellent secondary example of the inherent mistrust among thinkers of the Mandate era. As mentioned before, these negotiations took place secretly between Magnes and certain Arab notables, with Philby as an intermediary. Magnes undertook these negotiations without official sanction from any political group, and distributed its contents to certain American figures with the hopes of convincing them of parity and thereby pressuring Weizmann to adopt a more active policy towards bi-nationalism, lest he risk the support of his American friends.[48] The contents of this negotiation were mentioned above, but what is of particular interest is Magnes’ use of Philby as an intermediary. Magnes actually refused a proposal from the U.S. Consul to meet with Hajj Amin directly.[49] He cites the reasons for this refusal as threefold: “a. I represented no organization; b. I know the Mufti’s terms; and he could not emphasize them; and if he minimized them I had no answer; c. He might misinterpret the visit and so might my own friends.”[50] This explanation is less than adequate. First, Magnes’ lack of official representation did not stop him from undertaking the negotiations entirely. What difference was there between using Philby as an intermediary and talking to Hajj Amin? The second point seems feasible, given that the proposal was made after the negotiations took place. The third, however, is of particular importance. By using Philby as an intermediary, Magnes was able to conceal his identity. This would, presumably, prevent personal biases from manifesting in the negotiations. It seems Magnes was especially careful of this fact, worrying that the Mufti might change his opinions based on with whom he was dealing. Whether or not this was a pragmatic or justified concern on the part of Magnes is immaterial. Fundamentally, what matters is that there was a basic mistrust on the part of Magnes for the Mufti to remain consistent in his expressed desires. There is an assumption, real or imagined, that Hajj Amin would not be completely honest and open about his opinions if he knew exactly with whom he was dealing. This anonymity seemed to be Magnes’ goal all along, as he states, “I thought it of advantage to know what the Arabs were ready to yield and what it was they were saying in private and how far their public statements differed from their private plans.”[51] Here, Magnes assumes a pre-existing disconnection between public rhetoric and private desires, implying that the Arab leadership had ulterior motives that could only be estimated through anonymous communication. This assumption may have been valid, but the point is that it represents a genuine mistrust of the Arab leadership on the part of Magnes. Essentially, he did not believe that they would tell the truth about their intentions if they new to whom and in what capacity they were speaking. And, if Magnes’ assumption was indeed valid, it would indicate a mistrust on the part of the Arab leadership in that they would have been wary of the potential conflicts of interests in regards to negotiating with certain Jewish figures. Whatever the case, it is clear that a lack of trust permeated the very concept of the Magnes-Philby negotiations.

Finally, one should recall the ideology of the bi-nationalist, which held that mutual good will would arise from the necessities of cooperation, and that it was the fault of all parties involved that such cooperation was not stressed. However, it seems as though cooperation, when it did occur, did not have precisely the imagined results. Referring to the example of the Palestinian Railway, it seems that cooperation did not usually lead to good will. Although some Arabs and Jews established personal relationships, as evidenced by attendance of Arabs at Jewish funerals, Lockman notes, “apparently in their leirsure time within and outside the workplace they generally kept to themselves.”[52] This idea is an echo of Shapiro’s earlier statement that “The meeting of Jewish and Arab workers on the job may have engendered some feelings of solidarity, but it also created problems of communication which were rooted in differences in nationality, religion and culture.”[53] It should be noted that evidence of personal relationships is sketchy at best, and that there is no real way of telling exactly how successful these examples of cooperation were at fostering understanding. However, one should recall the failed attempts at joint labor posited by both the bi-nationalists of Brit Shalom and the Histadrut, the latter of which especially seemed to break down due to mistrust, especially with regards to the Histadrut’s refusal to accept Arab participation in their political party. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that the example of the Railway workers was unique in terms of cooperation. In fact, a union of railway, postal, and telegraph workers was set up which featured approximately half Arab and half Jewish participants.[54] However, even these examples of joint labor had a very short existence and tended to dissipate due to mistrust and split loyalties to national causes.[55] Thus, even in the atypical examples of cooperation, mistrust seemed to overcome attempts at conciliation.

Taken together, these assumptions and events could be seen as part of a larger conceptual divide between Eastern and Western culture. This division can be seen as far back as Joseph Horrowitz’ speech, which called for Jews to adopt “Eastern” ways and manners. Furthermore, Western assumptions seemed to underlie the issues of immigration and equal participation. After his disillusionment with Brit Shalom in 1931, Arthur Ruppin wrote, “What the Arabs are willing to give us is at most minority rights for the Jews in an Arab state, according to the pattern of minority rights in Eastern Europe. But we have sufficient experience from the situation in Eastern Europe to what extent one can force the majority nation, which holds the reins of power, to give the minority real national equality. The fate of the Jewish minority in Palestine will always depend on the good will of the Arab majority holding the reins of Government.”[56] It is significant that Ruppin draws a parallel between the treatment of the Jewish minority in Eastern Europe and the perceived possibility of treatment in Palestine. Ruppin, like many other members of Brit Shalom, came from an Eastern European background, and likely had first-hand experience with the persecution of Jews in that part of Europe. To draw this parallel is strange, however. Throughout the history of the Islamic world, Jews were indeed treated with inferior status, but rarely made subject to persecution and pogroms which threatened their safety. Though there is evidence of Jewish persecution in the East (such as the Damascus affair), there does not seem to be similar circumstances as those which took place in Eastern Europe. Thus, it would be fallacious to draw an analogy between Eastern Europe and what might happen under an Arab Palestinian rule. Though Ruppin might have had reason to suspect an unwarranted amount of persecution, he chose to justify his reasoning not with examples of the current social and political climate in Palestine, but rather with reference to events in Europe. This represents a fundamental assumption of the primacy of the West, in that what happens in Europe must inevitably occur among Eastern non-Jews when faced with similar circumstances of power. It is interesting that this mistrust of the non-Jew, and especially the Arab, found its way into the core of the Arab question, despite historical precedent of relatively peaceful coexistence in that part of the world.

It is perhaps possible that this mistrust permeated much of the Zionist policy. The Histadrut’s policy towards organizing Arab labor expressed a similar bias against the supposedly backward Arab. As Shapiro writes, the perception was that, “It was up to the Jewish workers… to play an active role in organizing the Arab workers who, in view of their backward condition, were unable to organize themselves.”[57] Here, the very issue of organizing Arab labor becomes suspect as part of a fundamental assumption that Arabs could not and would not organize.

Although somewhat different in expression, these two examples point to a disjunctive view of Western and Eastern culture that was endemic to both bi-nationalists and other mainline Zionist organizations. On the one hand, there is the tendency to assert the primacy of European history and course of events and on the other there is the idea of the backwardness of the “other,” the Arab. They are expressions of the same conceptual disjunction.

Conclusion

Brit Shalom and its related institutions and thinkers thus represented a unique view on the link between ideology and practical action, while at the same time falling prey to biases and assumptions that permeated the discourse among European Jews during the Mandate era. Though both morally and practically inclined towards rapprochement, these figures nevertheless exhibited a fundamental mistrust of the Arab “other” while operating from a particularly Western concept of the Orient which did not reflect historical or contemporary reality. It should be noted, though, that neither of these elements could be argued as the cause of the bi-national solution’s failure. Other, and arguably more “successful” organizations, adopted many bi-nationalist ideas and practices, while at the same time making the same fundamental assumptions of East and West. Why, then, did parity fail and partition succeed? Why did the Histadrut come to dominate Israeli politics while bi-nationalism became an unrealistic dream? The historical evidence cannot explain this occurrence, but rather it can only highlight the characteristics of the various parties involved. There seems to be no historical force of causality or inevitability which decided the events which were to unfold. If one were to view the Mandate era through the eyes of one living during this time, then both parity and partition would seem possible outcomes, both in ideology and reality. Arabs and Jews may have misunderstood one another, but there was no reason to believe at this time that a remedy could not be found. Cooperation was in existence already, and although not widespread or conclusive, it seemed to indicate at least the possibility of cooperation to develop over time. It was this long-term view which motivated many bi-nationalists to not only pursue reconciliation, but also to avoid separation. Almost prophetically, Hans Kohn wrote in a letter, “I believe that it is possible that with English help and later with the help of our own bayonets… we will be able to hold on and grow in Palestine. However, we will not be able then to dispense with the bayonets. Those means will have that end.”[58] Kohn, like other Brit Shalom members, worked in a time when the future was unclear, and yet believed strongly that violent, colonialist means would have violent ends. Theirs was a mission not simply of ideology, but of the practical realization of the goals of Zionism and the Yishuv to survive peacefully given uncertain times.

It should be noted that this work was done in full consciousness of the bias of its writer. Indeed, his personal beliefs are sympathetic to the Brit Shalom thinkers and those associated with it, and he is morally supportive of unity between Jews and Arabs. Yet, this bias has been mitigated due to the recognized limitations of history: this essay has not endeavored to, nor would it be able to, prove the validity of a bi-national solution. It has not made a causative argument, nor attempted to demonstrate the practicality or impracticality of the solution – quite the contrary. The methods of historical reasoning cannot provide for such an argument. However, it has been the purpose to answer the question of “what?” in order to gain a better understanding of the movement for those who are interested. Opponents of the bi-national dream can rightly continue to oppose, as it is impossible for any serious historical scholarship to defeat their position. However, those who support unity can continue to do so with full confidence in their dream. History cannot validate their position, but neither can it invalidate it. Thus, the real benefit of such research as this is a better understanding of the issue in its historical context, regardless of one’s particular vision for the future. Historians cannot look to the past to predict the course of events any more than astrologers can predict the future by looking to the stars. As of yet, no one can claim a knowledge of the future. And hence, no one can rightfully dismiss an idea based on its assumed historical “impracticality.” Such non-answers at most become self-fulfilling prophecies.

And so, it is worthwhile to take account of Martin Buber’s words that “The conditions of action are constantly changing; there is always the obligation to do something else, something new, that is, to respond to a changing situation. But the correct response!” That is, the changing aspect of historical circumstance cannot justify ignoring one’s universal principles; indeed, history cannot provide us with the concrete answers necessary for such a compromise, nor any more “realistic” alternative to our beliefs and convictions. Rather, it necessary to understand history as it was and then to make our own judgments, and to use our knowledge positively and actively to make the morally correct decisions for the future. Changing circumstances can neither justify nor invalidate our moral imperatives, nor change our obligation to do what is right.

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[1] Paul Mendes-Flohr, ed, Martin Buber: A Contemporary Perspective (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2002), 135.

[2] Ibid., 59-60.

[3] Susan Lee Hattis, The Bi-National Idea in Palestine During Mandatory Times (Haifa: Shikmona, 1970), 38.

[4] Ibid., 65.

[5] Ibid., 48.

[6] Ibid., 47.

[7] Ibid., 61.

[8] Ibid., 139.

[9] Ibid., 291.

[10] Ibid., 292.

[11] Ibid., 305.

[12] Tom Segev, One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the Mandate (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000), 409.

[13] Hattis, The Bi-National Idea in Palestine, 320.

[14] Segev, One Palestine, Complete, 409.

[15] Menahem Kaufman, The Magnes-Philby Negotiations, 1929: The Historical Record, ed. by Moshe Goodman (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, the Hebrew University, 1998), 152-3.

[16] Ibid., 86.

[17] Martin Buber, et al., Palestine, A Bi-National State (New York, NY: Ihud (Union) Association of Palestine, 1946), 75-6.

[18] Ibid., 76.

[19] Hattis, The Bi-National Idea in Palestine, 46.

[20] Ibid., 287.

[21] Ibid., 294-5.

[22] Ibid., 56-7.

[23] Buber, Palestine, A Bi-National State, 43.

[24] Mendes-Flohr, Martin Buber, 71.

[25] Ibid., 6.

[26] Ibid., 5-6.

[27] Hattis, The Bi-National Idea in Palestine, 82-3.

[28] Ibid., 85.

[29] Ibid., 92.

[30] Anita Shapiro, “The Ideology and Practice of the Joint Jewish-Arab Labour Union in Palestine, 1920-39,” Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 12, no. 4 (Oct., 1977): 671.

[31] Ibid., 681-2.

[32] Ibid., 671.

[33] Ibid., 675-7.

[34] Zachary Lockman, “Railway Workers and Relational History: Arabs and Jews in British-Ruled Palestine,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 35, no. 3, (Jul., 1993): 610.

[35] Ibid., 618.

[36] Ibid., 612.

[37] Ibid., 613.

[38] Hattis, The Bi-National Idea in Palestine, 86.

[39] Segeve, One Palestine, Complete, 410-1.

[40] Mendes-Flohr, Martin Buber, 76.

[41] Ibid., 11.

[42] Hattis, The Bi-National Idea in Palestine, 155.

[43] Kaufman, The Magnes-Philby Negotiations, 102.

[44] Ibid., 108.

[45] Ibid., 110.

[46] Hattis, The Bi-National Solution in Palestine, 257.

[47] Ibid., 63-64.

[48] Kaufman, The Magnes-Philby Negotiations, 4.

[49] Ibid., 14.

[50] Ibid., 139.

[51] Ibid., 119.

[52] Lockman, “Railway Workers,” 618-19.

[53] Shapiro, “Ideology and Practice,” 678.

[54] Lockman, “Railway Workers,” 614.

[55] Ibid., 614.

[56] Hattis, The Bi-National Idea in Palestine, 57.

[57] Shapiro, “Ideology and Practice,” 675.

[58] Hattis, The Bi-National Idea in Palestine, 58.