The End of The Golden Age: Part 3

In my first piece of the series, I made a passing comment about the “so-called” Golden Age of Islam, implying a question as to whether this is indeed an accurate description. However, I held off on expanding upon this idea until now, as I first needed to establish some ground work. For their majority, the last two essays have operated on a very Western bias and outlook towards Eastern science and philosophy. This was partially intentional. I wished to present that outlook as it is the easiest place to start, and it is the starting point of most modern history one might read on the subject. I only inserted marginally challenging ideas to this bias, such as the defense of Al-Ghazali’s support of science and the idea of ijtihad of the spirit, but the even these were at heart Western in conception. But, having planted the seed of these doubts and different perspectives, it is now time to reap. This final installment will be a dedicated expose and attack on the Western biases which heretofore have assumed the end of Islamic science and thought. Indeed, it is totally mistaken to claim that the Golden Age of Islam ended. These ideas have more to do with the development of modern Western culture than they do with the actual history of the Middle East.

Background

In order to make the argument, let us try first to see the West through Eastern eyes, so to speak. That is, let us take the issue raised in the second essay, that of ijtihad vs. taqlid, and transfer it to an overview of Western scientific development in the early modern era. Strangely, this concept (which I posited as conceptual, not actual), is far more useful for understanding European intellectual history than it is for understanding the Middle East and Islamic world.

Historians of science in particular like to point to the significance of Copernicus and Galileo’s challenges to the geocentric model of the world, claiming that this was what resulted in a complete shift from medieval style science to the Mechanistic model of reality. And, hence, it resulted in what would come to be known as modern science. In pre-modern Europe, astronomy was not simply a branch of science, but a foundational model of the universe. Ptolemy’s (and Aristotle’s) geocentric system worked on philosophical and religious principles that ordered the universe in a series of spheres upon spheres, such as the orbit of planets, all the way out to the sphere of the stars, and beyond that the Prime Mover, i.e. God. God would spin the nearest sphere of the stars, and all others would then begin to turn as well, all the way down to the center. Thus could God guide all action and causality in the universe and on Earth. This, by the way, is part of the justification for astrology: assuming this model is true, one could predict what would happen on Earth based on the movement of planets and stars.

Coinciding with and dependent upon this model was also Aristotle’s views on physics. Aristotle argued that there were four elements: earth, water, air, and fire. And, in a perfect world, each had its place: earth was down, water was just above it, air was just above that, and at the top was fire. But the world isn’t perfectly set up like this; all of the elements are mixed. Mountains rise above the sea, fire can be found deep within the earth (i.e. magma), and so forth. But, Aristotle, claimed, these elements all tended to move towards their perfect place. Thus, earth tends to fall down, air tends to rise, water tends to settle in between, and so on. This essentially explained all physical motion without the need for modern notions like gravity, density, and so on. Given this conception, then, the Earth had to be at the center of the universe.

But, if someone were to challenge this model, then entire thing would fall apart. If the sun were at the center of the universe, the Earth would fall into it. If the Earth were to move, then it would fly apart. If the orbit of planets was not a perfect circle, they couldn’t be on a celestial sphere. If all of this were untrue, then where would be the Prime Mover? What room would there be for God? Given this reality, most European scientists and religious officials had a vested interest in the geocentric model and Aristotelian physics. All this began to change, say historians, when Copernicus demonstrated that a sun centered universe would fit our observations and calculations just as well as a geocentric one. That is, the sun may very well be at the center, because it would result in the same mathematical consequences. Needless to say, this would be a very troubling concept for European thought.

However, this was a non-issue in Islam. As inheritors of several different traditions of astronomy, from the Greeks to the Persians to the Indians, Islamic theology and philosophy was not tied up in concerns about the nature of the universe in terms of geocentric vs. heliocentric. Ptolemy’s model was used extensively because it did explain quite a bit of phenomenon and allowed for accurate predictions. But many Muslim astronomers questioned this system, some even going so far as to make proto-Copernican arguments for a sun-centered system. Most notable among them are Ibn al-Haytham (965 – 1039), al-Biruni (973-1048) and Nasir ad-Din al-Tusi (1201-1274). All three were geocentrists, but often made the similar point of Copernicus that a heliocentric universe would result in similar calculations and observations. In fact, all three were active critics of Ptolemy, championed experimental method and empirical observation, and did believe the Earth moved (on its axis). Al-Tusi was actually able to empirically demonstrate this final point. Historians are now finding that the models, arguments, and mathematics of these three, especially the last, can be found throughout Copernicus’ work. Whether he developed his ideas independently or had access to scattered translations, Copernicus was clearly working with a vast amount of similar information as his Muslim predecessors. So why, then, is the work of Copernicus and those like him so monumental and the work of their Muslim counterparts not?

Before answering, let us continue our analysis of Western science with Galileo. By this time, the telescope had been invented, allowing for more detailed observations than before. With the recent work of figures such as Brahe and Kepler, it was soon becoming clear that the Ptolemaic system couldn’t entirely explain everything. Galileo, working with his own observations and with Copernicus’ writings, became the first to really push for the heliocentric model of the universe. He also experimented in physics, challenging a lot of the old Aristotelian ideas of motion. Galileo’s arguments were very sound, but if he were right, it would mean that all astronomy and all physics up until that point would have to be rethought (at least in Europe). As brilliant as he was, Galileo was also skilled at making enemies, and he soon was able to make an enemy out of the Pope. The history at this point is well known: the persecution of Galileo by the Inquisition, the reaction of scientists against established truths, the formation of Newtonian physics, and so on. Suffice to say, historians of science often point to Copernicus and Galileo’s contribution towards the heliocentric model as the first step towards a new physics, a new science, and consequently, even new philosophy. With all old truths in doubt and all old authorities in question, thinkers such as Descartes felt compelled to start with reasoning alone, resulting in his famous words, “I think, therefore I am.” Thomas Hobbes began constructing a whole new conception of society based on similar original reasoning, beginning by positing man “in a state of nature,” i.e. before any government, and then reasoning out what kind of government is best. In short, this new doubt for everything spread to all aspects of European intellectual life, not simply the sciences. Galileo did not simply cast doubt on Ptolemy and Aristotle (as Muslim thinkers did so long before him), he cast doubt on the authority of religion, the church, and all traditional sources of authority. In a sense, then, we could say that Galileo made it necessary for European thinkers to abandon any sort of “taqlid of spirit” in favor of a kind of hyper-ijtihad wherein everything must be doubted and subjected to individual reasoning, from the ground up. And of course, historians say, it is from these new thinkers that the modern world was formed: democracies, the industrial revolution, advanced medicine, and so on.

As mentioned before, the geocentric world view was never so entangled in traditional authority, whether religious or secular, as it was in Europe. Thus, we might be able to understand why questioning it would not send so many shock waves through the intellectual culture. In other words, if Galileo had lived in 12^th century Baghdad and come up with the same ideas, what we think of as modern science, modern philosophy, and modernity in general may not even have happened. More likely, he would be among peers who would consider his ideas interesting, open for debate like anything else, but ultimately not be motivated to question every other traditional authority. There wouldn’t be a need for a Muslim version of Descartes, for example, nor a Muslim equivalent of Hobbes, or Locke, or Newton. The traditional authorities in science, society, and religion would have been adaptable enough to accommodate a heliocentric model without sending shock waves reverberating throughout all other aspects of society. In a way, then, modern scientists of the West actually own a debt of gratitude to the Catholic Church: by being so dogmatic and repressive of science, it actually gave challenging, new science greater effect! Islam, on the other hand, was perhaps too respectful of science for its own good.

Argument

But of course, this version of history carries a very strong Western bias: specifically, the assumption that the modern ideas that developed since Galileo are inherently superior and part of a historical teleology from start to finish. This is the assumption intentionally operating in all of my previous writing on the issue, right through the very last sentence of the preceding section in this essay. But, let us also look at the subtle clues hidden in my arguments: In my first essay, I argued that Al-Ghazali and those like him actually had a pro-scientific spirit. In my second essay, I argued that a taqlid of spirit dominated in the Muslim world, but at the same time I suggested that it was only a conceptual point, as the historical fact is that the gate never truly closed on ijtihad. And, in this essay, I have already demonstrated how Muslim science had a strong tradition of challenging norms and old models of science and philosophy without much constraint from traditional authority. So, let us return to my original question from the first installment of this series: “Why did the Golden Age of Islam come to an end?”

There is no real answer to this question, only a punchline. The Golden Age didn’t end. It was the European outlook which ended and began anew. Through its own inner workings, Modern European thought shifted into a form of hyper-ijtihadism, in which the gate closed on taqlid. This constituted what came to be modern era rationalization. Everything was rebuilt from the bottom up, premise by premise. Thinkers began with a “state of nature,” a first premise such as “I think, therefore I am,” and began reformulating every idea in every branch of human thought, from philosophy to science, and guiding every question from “What is the best form of government?” to “How did the universe begin?” Thinkers pursued these topics explicitly without the reliance on old authorities. They trusted only their sole reasoning. What resulted was the Age of Enlightenment, and eventually, the modern world.

But reasoning itself was nothing new. Reasoning had been around for quite some time. The principles of logic are ancient, as are math and the sciences. These men of Europe didn’t somehow get thinking “right” after all these millennia; thinking was right before. What mattered was their way of thinking, their hyper-ijtihadism, their rejection of all past authority, doubt for everything, and sole reliance on their own reasoning for knowledge. This was new. This didn’t, however, make them “more right.” Their mathematical principles were just as valid as the mathematical principles of the medieval Muslim astronomers. Their principles of logic were just as valid (or invalid, which was often the case) as their medieval Muslim forbearers’. What changed was an entire view of the world, a particularly Western view. It is from this view that came the notion of a Golden Age of Islam, as well as the notion of its decline.

As mentioned before, Western thinking became focused on rejecting authority and working from a foundational premise to all conclusions with an unerring logic. This was not simply a method, but a world view. To modern Western thinkers, reality itself would come to be seen as following the same process. That is, the history of existence flows from an original premise to a conclusion with an unerring logic, from one point to the next, in a secular teleology from start to finish. In short, it was the development of the idea of progress. A culture, they would come to believe, develops from its first, or “primitive,” form to its final development, like an evolution. And, all the cultures of the world followed the same logical progression. Given this view, it is easy to understand how someone might come to grips with the history of the Islamic world. Muslims science in the Middle Ages represented one stage, much like it did in Europe before Copernicus. But, it never developed into modern European style of thinking. To our new breed of European thinker, this presented a huge problem. If all of history is supposed to develop along a logical path of progress, then how to we come to terms with the fact that the Islamic world didn’t “progress” in the same way “we” did? Something must have interrupted the flow of nature. Something must have gotten in the way of the logical, “natural” progression. In short, something must have happened to end this age. And furthermore, this age must represent the last point of progress before decline, a marvelous “Golden Age” which at once promised future progress, but ended in disappointment.

This is the real source of the problem and the real source of the question: it is nothing more than a modern European illusion, an invention of a peculiarly European way of thinking since the modern era began. As such, it is the wrong question entirely. Nothing ended the Golden Age. There never was a Golden Age. There was an age, time passed, change occurred, and this change occurred on its own terms. A better question would be, “Why do we think the Golden Age ever existed?” The answer is that it is a modern, Western invention.

And this also tends to explain the mistakes of Western historians in interpreting Islamic history and philosophy. As hyper-ijtihadists looking for a theory of progress, it is natural to assume that independent reasoning is what leads to “higher” forms of culture. Europe moved from a religious, authority-centered world to one of freedom of thought, therefore independent reasoning tends to further science, philosophy, and society, whereas traditionalism, or “taqlid of spirit,” has the opposite effect. Such is the most reasonable assumption for one coming from a modern, European perspective. Thus, in looking for a cause for decline, one must look for tradition and traditionalists. Islam was a popular target for the likes of Ignaz Goldziher and his contemporaries. They argued that Islam was anti-science. Another popular target was Al-Ghazali, who does indeed hold a lot of respect for traditional authorities, particularly the Qur’an. And then, of course, there is the entire tradition of taqlid in Islamic jurisprudence, an explicit example of reliance on authority. To a modern, Western thinker, these are the most natural culprits. They simple fit the Western worldview in the best way. But, as I have been demonstrating with each of my three essays, they do not fit the evidence. These are not the real culprits. Taqlid never killed ijtihad, Al-Ghazali never killed philosophy (nor did Ibn Sina, for that matter), and Islam was not and is not anti-science. None of those arguments are supported by the evidence. In fact, the evidence contradicts them. These arguments are nothing more than conceptual fabrications based on the more fundamental fabrication: that a Golden Age ever existed.

Truly, this has not been a history of the Middle East or Islam. It has actually been a history of the Western world. My concepts of ijtihad and taqlid are indeed valuable for historical analysis, but for modern and early modern European culture, not for Islamic culture. Perhaps we should be grateful to the Arabic language for supplying the proper terms. In any case, there is still plenty that can be learned from this about the Middle East, Islam, and their histories. If we are to get a rational understanding of the East, as opposed to a rationalized one, it will require that we pick apart our assumptions in such a way as these three essays have done. The Middle East, Islam, and the cultures they entwine have changed in significant ways over time based on each one’s particular circumstances. There is no lack of development or progress, no backwardness or decline, and certainly no stagnation. These concepts and their corollaries are at best roadblocks to rational inquiry into the past, and as Said argued, they are at worst pathetically racist. If we can banish these biases from our minds, we can finally look at the evidence objectively.